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Partition in its prinitivo and technical import
signified a division by coparconrs, or co-heirs of lands
which had descended by common lawor by custom; but the term
has becoe equally applicable to a division of lands by
joint tenants or tenants in comnion.
There were few more unfortunate contingencies arising from ownership at common law than where co-tenants could
no longer agree as to the use and management of their coimmon
property or when one of the co-tenants took advantage of all
the op'oortunities which the co-tenancy afforded of distressing his companions in

interest, and thereby depriving them of

their just benefits in the common property.

Where the co-

tenancy was not the result of agreement, purchase or the act
of the parties ,it is clear that they were in no way responsible for its existence.

The earliest partition known to

law was in the aid of such co-tenantsproviding a moans by
which either might terminate the co-tenancy and obtain an
estate in severalty in lieu of an undivided interest.
Reeves in "The Law of England as it Existed Towards
the End of the Reign of Henry

II"

(1272)

states"that when

an inheritance descended to more than one heir I and they
could come to no agreement among themselves concerning the
division of it, a proceeding might be instituted to compell
a partition.

A writ wasr)for this purpose Idirected to four

or five persons who were appointed justices for the occason,
to
and they were extdnd. and appreciate the land by the oaths
of good and lawful persons chosen by the partieswho were
called extensors' and this extent was to be returned under
their seal~before the King or his justices.

When partition

was made in the King's court, in pursuance of such extent
there issued Saisinam habere facias for each of the parceners to have possession.,,

It would seemuor is likely Of--in-

ference,from P'r. Reeves text, that proceedings of partition
between parceners existed even prior to the time of Henry i1
The writ of partition could issue only at the instance of a co-parcenerbut the person against whom issued
might be either a

coparcener or one who had succeeded to

the interest of a coparcener.
Joint tenants and tenants in coimon became such by
their own voluntary act.

Their estate was always created by

purchase, and whatever inconvenience or hardship arose from

the co-ownership was considered as the result of a relation
voluntarily assumed by tho parties, and the law would grant
no relief by way of compulsory partition.

The only remedy,

was to purchase the moiety of others, sell his own, or make
voluntary partition with the other part owner.
The first step toward relieving the joint tenant1
and tenant in

comion from the burden under which they suffer-

od, in consequence of their inability to compel partition,
was:by statute of 31 Henry VII which provided.
ants in

That ten-

common) and joint tenants of estates of inheritance

held in their own rightor in that of their wives were compelled to make partition )"in like maanner as parceners by the
common law of the realm were compelled to do".

As will be

seen this statute applied only to joint tenancy and tenancy
in coyaon of estates of inheritance.
To ameliorate the condition of tenants of estates
not of inheritance,
enacted.

the second statute of 32 Henry VII was

It providod,"That all joint tenants ,or tenants in

coimon and every of them which now hold, or hereafter shall
hold/Jointly, or in coiwaonfor the term of life, year or
years, or joint tenants /or tenants in coimion where one or

some of them have or shall have) estate or estates for term
of life, or years, with the other /that 1haveor shall have estate ,or estates of inheritance) or frecholdin any manors,
lands,

tenements, or hereditamnents shall and may be compelled

from henceforth by writ of partition to be pursued out of
the King's Court of Chancery upon his or their case/ or cases,
to make severance and partition of all such manors, lands,
tenements and heraditaments which they hold jointly, or in
comon, for term of life or lives, year or years, or where
one,or some of them hold jointly, or in coimnohfo r term of
life

or years, with otheror that have estates of inheri-

tance or freehold.
It will be observedby a comparison of dates,that
three centuries elapsed, from the time when the right of coparceners to compel partition was clearly recognized and before the right of partition was extended to other co-tenants.
Chancery without express legislative sanction, exorcised jurisdiction of suits in partition as early as the
reign of Elizabeth.

This new jurisdiction was felt to be

such an improvement upon the expensive tedious and ofttimes
q
ip

inadequate,

writ of partition at law,

th~at it

rapidly grew

While the writ of partition at law passed into

in favor.

desuetude, and was finally abolished by statute of 3 and 4
Jillimn IV.
The first act authorizing the partition of estates
held by joint tenants, tenants in conmnon,and coparceners was
passed by lagislature of this state ',arch 16th 1785.

The

preamble of the act recites the necessity of the passage of
such statuteand the reasons which influenced the legislature
in authorizing the partition of land.

It declared "Whereas

mai y tracts of lands in this state are held by divers persons, as joint tenants, tenants in comixonand coparceners
and such tracts cannot by law be divided by reason of the
absence, infancy, or coverture of some of the proprietors,
to the great detriment of the owners, and the prejudice of
agriculture,"

therefore be it enacted etc.

This act

provided for actual partition of the estate only as between
the parties, with the sale of certain part of tract set
apart for defraying the expenses of the partition.

Section

four of said act authorized the commissioners to proceed and
sell at public vendue, to the highest bidder, that part of
said tract set apart to defray the expenses of partition,

"And their deed to tihI,

to 'ch
all

biddhr,

o

for- t~iu',or~ atu-aI

r]1.

-;m

ar good a title

jo ment of tho same as if

the patentees or proprietors of the said land had made

and executed the same in due form of law".
rovised in 1813.

This act was

Section 5 of the revised act authorizes

a sale in the same manner as the act of 1785.

Section 16

of this act, authorizes the court of chancery in cases of
partition to decree a sale of the premises in the same cases,
in which a court of law had power to decree a sale, or where
the ends of justice should require it, thus extending the
power of the court to deprec a sale in every case where it
should deem the ends of justice to be promoted thereby. Section 17 declared that all sales and partitions, had in the
court of chancery, should be firm and effectual foreverand
the final decree for partition or sale should be binding and
conclusive on all parties named in the proceedings,
their representatives;

or

and in like manner on all parties.whe,

whose interests,were unknown, as if the said proceedings had
taken place in a court of law, provided that when the parties interested wore unknown, or their estates3 or interests
were unknown proper allegations were made in

the complaint,

and notice was to be given to all such unknown persons or
parties.
by

If such unknown persons, or parties did not appear

a day certain the bill was to be taken as confessed by

them.
It rill be observed that the later acts are of the
same general character as this early legislation, but considerably broader, and the detail rendered more specific and
accurate so as to meet the needs of justice as between the
parties.
Since 1880 the action of partition has been governed
by the provisions found in the Code relating thereto.
It will be the purpose of this paper to treat of
the sections/ in so far as they relate to the questions as to
who may have partition, in what cases, the parties, plead4ngs and final judgment.

VOLUINTARY PARTITI ON.
--- OO0---

The sererance of the premises being the object of
the parties a voluntary partition was possible at comion law.
So at present, if

the parties are of full age and competent

to contract they may make partition bither by a deed,or
parole followed followed by possession.
A parole partition between tenants in comon, when
followed by exclusive possession of the portion of the property allotted, the partition is binding,

The exclusive

possession of the share results in the severing of the unity
of possession.

The parole agreement alone cannot sever the

unity of possession. (Taylor v -illard, 118 N.Y. 224)
The partition springs from the act of each tenant
with the consent of the others1 although practically a substitute for/ it it is not equivalent to mutual conveyances,
w7ich would sever the unity of possession if not followed by
actual possession.

No title is transferred by a parole

partition even when it is carried into effect, as it acts
only upon the unity of possessionand by ending that accomplishes the object in view.

It follows that the act of the

parties in carrying out a parole partition will bind them
and all who claim under them.

Whnere the parties acquiesce

in such a partition all incidental rights such as curtesy or
dower attach only to the portion sot apart for the person as
his share of tho.estate.

Ferguson v Tweedy (56 Barb.

68)

So also tenants in com-ion ,by interchange of deeds,
with or without the consent of their respective wives, may
make a partition of lands which shall be binding as to the
tenantsand their respective wives and the right of dower
then attaches to the shares assigned their respective husbands.

The partition so made must be fair and just as to

quality and quantity, and free from any fraud as against the
wives.

Huntington v Huntington, (9 Civ.Pro. Rep.

)

The principle underlying the cases seems to bethat partition
is an absolute right to which inchoate dower rights are subordinate;

that as it

may be compelled by law,

it

may be done

voluntarily, that as a judgment in partition only severs the
unity of possession and does not confer any new

title, so

an amnicable partition by deed or parole followed by possession, has the same effect and as the husband's title is not
affected, the wife's right depending onj and attached to that
title is not affected.

PARTITION BY ACTION.
---

o00---

By Whom and in What Cases.
7ction 1532 provides that where two or more persons hold and are in possession of real property, as joint
tenants or tenants in coimnaon,in which either of them has an
estate of inheritance,or for life,or

for years,any one or

more of them may maintain an action for the partition of the
property, according to the respective rights of the persons
interested therein; and for a sale thereof, if it appears
that a partition cannot be made,without great prejudice to
the owners.
To which mnay be added Rule 65.

VJhere several

tracts or parcels of land lying within the state are owned
the partition of
by the same personsiin comion, no separate action forAa part
thereof only shall be brought,without the consent of all the
parties interested therein and if brought without such consent the share of the plaintiff may be charged with the
whole cost of the proceeding, and when infants are interested
th-tpetition shall state whether the parties own any other
lands in

coiuton.
Jc till defer the consideration of this rule and

consider it under the complaint.
Before the apTlication of the Code it would seem,
that partition could not be maintained whore there was a
subsisting adverse posses-ion by a tenant in

co-ion or where

the person in possession denied the joint tenancy.

But it

would seem that under the present extension of the Code the
cases so deciding are no longer authority.

The action may

now be maintained, as the contention of the plaintiff in
such case, is not only as to the share to which he is entitled, but as to whether he is entitled to any share of the
property.

This controversy includes the trial of the ques-

tion of title

which is

tion of partition.

now possible under the Code in

Knap- v Burton (7

Weston v Stoddard (137

N.Y.

Civ.

Pro.

Rep.

an ac-

452)

119)

The,,possosrion,, referred to in the section is not
to be understood as a strict Pedis possessio, but a present
right to the possession as distinguished from the cases in
the next section where under certain circinnstances the remainderman may bring the action.
Tenants by the entirety are not within the statute,
unless the words joint tenants may be deemed in a general

sense to include such a tenancy.
a joint tenancy in

substance or form" Peckham.,

Schreck, (128 N.Y. 263)

,'it is not

Strictly no.
J

iStelz V

But they are within the equity of

the statute, and sinco husband and wife may now make partition by deed, there seems to be no reason why a court of
equity should not take jurisdiction where it is equitable to
decree partition between them.
A wife owning lands- as tenant in

coimaon with her

husband may maintain an action for partition against him.
Moor,.v .1oor,

(47 N.Y.407)

Tenants in

corndon within the rule of this section

need not be owners of life estates.

A husband of a de-

ceased heir holding her share as tenant by the curtesy, is a
tenant in

coiwnion with the other heirs holding in fee and may

maintain partition.

TiTton v Vail,

(53

Hun 324).

A tenant by the curtesy cannot maintain partition.
Reed,

(107

N.Y.545)

Though such tenant of an undivided

share may have partition.
In

Reed v

Tilton v Vail,

Baldwin v Baldwin,

(supra)

(74 Hun 415)

it

was stated

that a partition,or sale if necessary of property held in
joint tenancy could be had notwithstanding some of the joint

tenants objected.
Asnignee in

trust for the benefit of creditors of

a tenant for life may have partition. Van Aresdale v Drake,
(2

Barb.

299)

ford v Hewey,

Likowise an assignee in bankrupoy. Ruther(59 How.

231)

Although a receiver in

sup-

plemontary proceedings cannot maintain partition. Debois v
Cassidy, (75 N.Y. 298)
Partition of land obtained by action does not create title where none existed before.

The sole effect can

be to give title in severalty where before it was in common,
and it establishes and settles the title between the parties
to the action and their privies.

it cannot have greater

effect than a voluntary partition of the land by and between
all the parties interested therein.

Greonloaf v B,.F. & C.I.

R.R., (141 N.Y. 395)
(a) Partition by TRemaindermen.

Section 1533 proviaes -

Where two or more persons hold as joint tenants, or as tenants in coi-mon, a vested remainder or reversion, any one or
more of them may maintain an action for the partition of the
teal property to which it attaches according to their respective shares therein, subject to the interest of the per-

son holding the particular estate therein, but no sale of
the premises in such an action shall be made,except by and
with the consent in writing, to be acknowledged or proved
and certified in like manner as a deed to be recorded by the
person or persons owning and holding such particular estate
appear
or estates; and if in such an action it shall in any stage
A

thereof that partition or sale cannot be made without great
prejudice to the owners, the complaint riust be dismissed.
The disrissal of the complaint, as herein provided shall not
affect the right of any party to bring a new action, after
the termination of such particular estate.
Prior to this section of the Code,there was no
provision in the statutes by which remaindermen having undivided interests might institute an action for partition,
and the existence of a life estate in possession in all the
property, such as dower of the wife of the ancestor, procluded partition am~ng remaindermen.
(C6

N.Y.

Sullivan v Sullivan,

37)
Cases often arise where it is essential to the in-

terest of the owner of an undivided share in reversion or
remainder that his estate should be severed from that of his

co-tenants,if it is possible to do so without serious injury

to other owners.
The enactiont of this section was to settle the
doubt that existed as to the right of such partition by remaindermen.

The act provided for partition where such was

possible,but a sale was not to be had, and it only remained
for the court,where actual partition was impossible to dismiss the complaint.

Prior v Hall, (13 Civ.Pro.Rep.33) Levy v

Levy, (79 Hun 290)
The amendment of 1887 modified the soctionin so
far as to make a sale possible when the consent in writing
of the person holding the particular estate has bean obtained
and the same must be acknowledged or proved and certified
in like manner as a deed.
Under this section the life tenant is not a necessary party to the action, but the right to make him a party
defendant is given by section 1539.
Remaindorraon can have partition as between themselves notwithstanding a void devise in remainder limited on
a valid life estate by joining the devisees and may have a
sale if necessary, by getting consent of the devisee for
life. Van Brunt v Van Brunt, (14 St. Rep. 887)

(b) Partition by Infant.

Section 1534 provides -

An action for the partition of real property shall not be
brought by an infant, except by the written authority of the
surrogate of the county in which the property, or a part
thereof, is situated.

The authority shall not be given,

unless the surrogate is satisfied, by affidavit or other
competent evidence, that the interests of the infant will be
promoted by bringing the action.

A judgment for a partit-

ion or sale shall not be rendered in such an action, unless
the court is satisfiod that the interests of the infant will
be promoted thereby, and that fact is expressly recited in
the judgment.
The requirement in this section that the consent of
the surrogate shall be obtained, rather than that of the
Supreme Court is for the reason that such officer is usually
in a bettor position to inquire into the merits of the application.

Besides as the court in which the action was

brought is ultimately to determine the same question such
requirement will secure two scrutinies of the case by different judges.
The ap)lication should be made by petition and is

on behalf of the infant by his general guardian, if he has
one, and if not by a relative if the infant is under fourteen, or by the infant himself if over fomrteun.

It may be

ex parte, but must be verified, it need not be entitled, and
should set forth the facts showing that the infant is entitled to a partition and generally the reasons why he applies for leave to bring suit, and whether the parties own
any other lands in co~imnon.

The court being satisfied that

the interests of the infant require a partition will grant
the order.

Van Sanvoords Equity Practice, Vol 2.

Section 1535 provides

that a guardian ad litem for

an infant party in an action of partition can be appointed
only by the court.
The object of this section is to restrict in this
action the general provisions of section 472 of the Code as
to the appointiaent of guardian ad litort.
As a general rule the guardian ad litem, under this
section, can be appointed only by the court and an appointment, cannot be made in chambers.

As an exception it was

stated in Disbrow v Folger, (5 Abbott 53) that in the First
District Court such ordwr may be made by a judge at chambers

and it operates as an order of the court.
A general guardian cannot act for the infant; there
must he the appointaent of a guardian ad.litem.
Gulick,

(26 How.

Lansing v

250)

If no guardian is appointed, the decreo is irregular and the error cannot be excused though the infant has
come of age and tenders a release.

Kohler v Kohler, (2 Ed-

ward's Ch. 69)
Tho appointment of a guardian ad litom,for infant,
bxcept as here noted is the same as in other actions and is
regulated by scctionS468-477 inclusive of the Code.
Section 1536 provides - The security to be given by
a guardian ad litom for an infant party in an action for
partition must be a bond, to the people of this state, executed by him and one or rore sureties as the court directs,
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned for the faithful
discharge of the trust coimuitted to him as guardian, and to
render a just and true account of his guardianship in any
court or place where thereunto required.

The bond must be

filed with the clerk before the guardian eiters upon the execution of his duties, and it canot be dispensed with

although he is the general guardian of the infant.
In Crogan v Livingston, (17 N.Y. 218) it was held,
That if the guardian had failed to file the required bond
the court might order it filed nunc -pro tune at any stage of
the proceoding,even after judgment.

The right of the in-

fant is not complete until all the requirements of the statute have been fulfilled and a guardian ad litem has been appointed whi is capable of giving the required security.
Lyle v Smith, (i3 How. Pr. 104)
Bonds given by guardians ad litem for infants defendants ran to "tthe People of the State of New York .... to be
paid to the said infants utc." The infants were not previously named,but were named in the conditions of the bond,held
that there was a substantial compliance with the provisions
of the section of the code and a separate bond for each infant was~not imperatively required.Crouter v Crouter,133 N.Y.55.
(c)

Partition by Heir when Devise Claimed to be Void.

Section 1537 provides - A person claiming to be entitlcd,as
a joint tenant or tenant in coimnon, by reason of his being
an heir of a person who died, holding and in possession of
real property, nay maintain an action for the partition
thereof, whether he is in or out of possession, notwith-

standing an apparent devise thereof to another by the decedent, and possesFAon under such a devise.

But in such an

action, the plaintiff must allege and establish that the
apparent devise is void.
This section of the Code when enacted as the act of
1853, created an essentially different action than any which
before existed; prior thereto possession was a necessary ingredient to the maintenance of the action.
The Code so far changes the coiwaon law as to permit partition in a case where the plaintiff claims to be an
heir of a person who died holding and in possession of real
property, even if out of possessionnotwithstanding an apparent devise by the person whose heir the plaintiff claims
to be, provided he can establish the devise to be void.
In

Hewlett v Wodd (62 N.Y.

78) M1iller,

J.

said That

an action of partition can be maintained to determine the
validity of any devise or will of real estate,notwithstanding
an adverse possession.

The action is in the nature some-

what of an ejectment, but issues of fact are to be made up
and tried by a jury, and when the legal title is established,
a partition or sale may be granted upon application to the

court, as the relief demanded, after the main subject Of the
controversy has boon determined by a jury.
It is obviously the intent and purpose of the act
to provide a direct and prompt i'ode of determining the rights
of the parties.

To combine in the action of partition the

former necessary action of ejectment to determine the title,
and to give complete relief, even to the determination of
conflicting claims to the title or possession of the property.
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to allege and
establish that the apparent devise is void.

There is no

l'titation to the causes or reasons that may be alleged.
would seem to

be necessary that all should be alleged that

the party desires at any time to take advantage of.
Zeh (82 Hun

It

Best v

3=2)

All questions arising between the parties in regard
to their respective titles and rights of possession in real
property may be determined, but the plaintiff cannot incorporate in his action, under this section, an issue, which if
proved would have no tendency to show that the "apparent
devise" is void.

Ellerson v Westoott (148 N.Y. 149)

Parties to the Action.
(a)

Who Mlust be Parties.

Section 1538 provides -

Every person having an undivided share in possession or
otherwise, in the property,

as teanmt in fee, for life, by

the curtesy, or for years; every person entitled to the reversion, remainder, or inheritance of an undivide share,
after the deteri iination

of a particular estate therein;

avery parson who, by any contingency contained in a devise,
or grant, or otherwise, is or may become entitled to a beneficial interest in an undivided share thereof; every person
having an inchoate rijht of dower in an undivided share in
the property; and every person having a right of dower in
the property, or any part thereof, which has not been admeasured, must be made a party to an action for a partition.
But no person other than a joint tenant or a tenant in common of the property, shall be a plaintiff in the action.

In

a partition action, the executors or administrators and creditors of a deceased personuwho, if living should be a party
to said action, rmust be made parties,4efendant.

And if the

complaint in such action alleges, and it is made to appear
by proof that there are unpaid debts of said deceased pay-

able out of his estate, the premises sought to be partitioned
may be sold free from such debts, and the money produced by
such sale shall be brought into court, and the same,or so
much thereof as may be necessary, shall be used for the payment of such debts in the same manner as the debts of a deceased person are paid from the proceeds of sale of real
estate in surrogate's court.

And the court in which said

action is brought may proceed to ascertain such debts and
direct their payment from such proceeds; or such court may
direct such money to be paid into the proper surrogate's
court, and direct the same to be administered as if the sale
of such interest in said land had been made on the decree of
such -surrogate.
The amenaaent of 1890 added the last three sentences making necessary parties, the executor or administrator,
and creditors of a deceased person, who if living should be
a party; and providing that the premises may be sold free
from his debts; and regulating the payment of such creditors of deceased.

Salis v Salis (19 N.Y. Sup. 240)

The provision in the section

- That anyone is a

necessary party who by any contingency contained in any devise

or grant or otherwise, is or may become entitled to a beneficial interest in an undivided interest in the property,
must be construed as referring only to a case where the contingency is created by devise, grant, or other instrument.
The essential importance of joining all parties, in the action that have any interest whatsoever in the estate, is apparent when a sale becomes necessary.

An omission to have

joined all the necessary parties in the action, affords the
purchaser a valid excuse for relief from the sale and defeats the object of the whole proceedings. Jordan v Pillon,
(77 N.Y. 518)

Under the section the husband, of one who has an
interest in the property is not a necessary or proper party
defendant where he has no interest or right therein. Barnes v
Blake (50 Hun 37).

The husband of a joint tenant who died

intestate is a necessary party.

Bogert v Bogert, (25 N. Y.

State Rep. 37$5)
Prior to this section, it was held, that the wives
of the parties while proper were not necessary; but they are
now classed among those who must be joined. Knapp v Hungerford (7

Hun 583)

The person in possession should be made

a party. Kapp v Kap-

(15

St. Rep.

967)

Whore the real estate is converted into personalty
by will of the testator, and the whole title vests in trustees, the parties entitled to the fund are not necessary defendants.

Cornell v Cornell (107 N.Y. 644)
The section, after naming the necessary parties

declares, that no person other than a joint tenant or tenant
in coimnon of the property shall be a plaintiff in the action.
This prohibition does not affect the right of a tenant by
the curtesy of an undivided share of his deceased wifes share
in land to bring partition.
where the plaintiff

Tilton v Vail (42 Hun 638) Also

a tenant in

coixion joined with himself

as co-plaintiff his wife, who had an inchoate right of dower
in his share.
provision.

In so doing he did not violate the above

Foster v Foster (38 Hun 365)

Where the suit was coimmienced,

by one under the sec-

tion a proper party to the action, but not a joint tenant or

tenant in coimmon,

and so riot entitled to be plaintiff, it

was hold- That the defectwas not jurisdictional and a decree
directing a sale, if erroneouswas

ot absolutely void, and

where no appealwas taken the jud gment is conclusive upon the

parties.

Reed v Reed (107 N.Y. 545).
If upon the death of one of two or more plaintiffs,

or one of two or more defendants, in an action for partition,
the interests of the decedent in the property passed to a
person not a party to the action, the latter may be made
defendant by the order of the court and a sutplemental summons may be issued to bring him in accordingly. Code, Section 1583.
(b)

Who 'day be Parties.

Section 1539 provides-

That the plaintiff may, at his election, make a tenant by
the curtesy, for life or for years, of the entire property
or whoever may be entitled to a contingent or vested remainder or reversion in the entire property, or a creditor
or other person having a lien or interest which attaches to
the entire property a defendant in the action.

In that

case the final judgnent may either award to such party his
or her entire right and interest or the proceeds thereof, or
where the right-or interest is contingent, direct that the
proceeds or share thereof be sfostituted for the property
;nd invested for whoever may eventually be entitled thereto,
or may reserve and leave unaffected his or her right and

interest or any portion thereof.

A person specified in

this section who was not made a party, is not affected by
the judgiaont

in

the action.

The ainencbqent of 1892 inserted the provision as to
those entitled to a contingent or vested remainder or reversion in the entire property.

The tenant in dower having

been made a necessary party under-section 1538 was omitted
from this section by the sarao aiindment of 1892.

It would

seem that under this section not only a person who actually
has a lion or interest, but one who apparently has or claims
to have, a lien or interest upon the entire property may be
made a party.

Best v Zeh (82 Hun 232)

Section 1540 provides -

The plaintiff may, at his

elecetion,make a creditor, having a lien on an undivided
share or interest in the property, a defendant in the action.
In that case, he must set forth the nature of the lien, and
specify the share or interest to which it attaches.
partition of the property is

made,

If

the lien, whether the

creditor is or is not made a party, shall thereafter attach
only to the share or interest assigned to the party upon
whose share or interest the lien attached; which must be

first charged with its just proportion of the costs and expenses of the action, in preferenco to the lion.
The provision, that where a partition of the property has be,,rn made,

the lien of a creditor whether such

creditor is or is not made a party,

shall thereafter attach,

only to the share or interest assigned to the party upon
whose shareor interest the lien attached, is intended to
apply only to a case where an actual'partition is made and
not to the case of a sale.

Jackson v Bradhurst (37 IT.Y.

Sup. 1068)
The people of the State may be made a party defendant to an action for the partition of real property, in the
same manner as a private person.

In

such a case,

mons must be served upon the Attorney General,
pear in behalf of the poeple.

the stm-

who must ap-

Code, Section 1594.

Section 1541 provides - Where a defendant having a
share or interest in the property is unknown, or where his
name or part of his name is

unknnown,

and the sunmons is

ser-

ved upon him by publication, as prescribed in article 2nd of
title 1st of chapter 5th of this act, the notice subjoined
to the copy of the suiymons as published or served therewith

must, in addition to the matters required in that article,
state briefly the object of the action and contain a brief
description of the property.
The statute as to notice and publication must be
complied with and the record must show such facts before any
steps can be taken to determine the rights of the unknown
parties. Denning v Corwin (11 Wend. 647)

Pleadings.
Complaint.

Section 1542 provides - The com-

plaint rmust describe the property with coi-mon certainty,

and

must specify the rights, shares, and interests therein of
all the parties, as far as the same are known to the plainttiff.

if a party, or the share, right, or interest of a

party, is unkcnown to the plaintiff; or if a share, right, or
interest is uncertain or contingent; or if the ownership of
the inheritance depends upon an executory devise;

or if

a

remainder is a contingent remainder, so that the party cannot be named; that fact must also be stated in the complaint.
To which may be added Rule 65 given on page 10;
Also Rule CC - Where the rights and interests of
the several parties,

as stated in

the complaint,

are not

denied or controverted, if any of the defendants are infants,
or absontees,

or unknomn,

the plaintiff

on an affidavit Of

the fact, .ld notice to such of the parties as have appeared,
may ap-rly at a special term for an order of reference to
take proof of the plaintiff's title and interest in the premises, and of the several matters set forth in the complaint;
and to ascertain and report the rights and interests of the
several parties in the premises, a;;d an abstract of the conveyance by which the same are hold."

Such referee shall in

all cases be selected by the court.
The jurisdiction of the court is confined to the
property set forth in the complaint;
statutory and in rem.

the proceedings being

Crowithor v Griffing,(21 Barb. 9)

The rules of pleading in partition are broad by
reason of the character of the relief sought,and given, and
while it is required by the section, that the rights of the
parties be stated so far as they are unknown to the plaintiff;

where the interests are not known it

described as a blaimr

may properly be

Townsend v Bogert (126 N.Y.370).

An error to state in the complaint correctiy the
interests and shares of the parties, or any omission to

state , what on motiori,
sert,

plaintiff

might be compelled to in-

by way of arientmiont, wili not render the decree irreg-

ular.

Noble v Cromwell (26 Barb. 475)
The earlY decisions holding that an allegation of

posression is necessary, are superceded, and it has been
held under the revised statutes which is the basis of this
section as unnoces%2ary to aver that the parties or those
from whom they derive title
Hampton (110 N.Y.
If

were ever in possession. Winman v

429)

the plaintiff seeks to recover rents and profits,

the facts ontitling him to such profits must be alleged.
Bulwinkor v Ryker (12 Abb. Pr.311)
The plaintiff will be permitted to amend the complaint,

where without fault on his part,

certain -Parties defendants.
In an

:i

omitted to make

Hall v Campbell (77 flun 567)

action of partition, can unite with it other

causes of action arising out of the same transaction, when
the acts that give rise to such other causes of action create
liens upon the real estate if they be not declared invalid.
Best v Zoh,(-2 Hun 232)
It was not the purpose of Rule 65 to establish a

a rule of pleading,

or to deny partition in

any case,

if

all

the lands owned by the parties as tenants in corw.ion, were
not made the subject of partition in the pending suit.

The

object of the rule is to protect parties from the burden and
annoyance of a multiplicity of suits when they are tenants
in coT,;on of several tracts or parcels of land lying within
the State.

The last paragraph requiring, that when infants

are intercsted and made parties, the comrlaint shall state
whether or not, the parties owned other lands in

coimuon,

was

inserted for the purpose of having the fact appear on the
face of the pleading.

At rmost an omission to make an aver-

ment in compliance with the rule in a mere irregularity in
procedure which cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer.
Pritchard v Dratt (32 Hun 417).
Answer.

I-ction 1543 provides -

Tie title

or in-

terest of the plaintiff in the property, as stated in the
complaint, may be controverted by the answer.

The title or

interest of any defendant in the propertyas stated in the
complaint, may also be controverted by his answer, or the
answer of any other defendant; and the title or interest of
any defendant, as stated in his answer, may be controverted

by the answor of any othor defendant.
controverting

tho title

A defendant, thus

or interest of a co-defendant,

must

comply with section five hundred and twenty-one of this act.
The issues,joinod at
and determined in

doscribed in

this section, must be tried

the action.

The provision of moction 521, referred to, requiros
that a defendant who seeks a detemiination, between himself
and a co-defendant, must demand it in his answer and must at
least twenty days before the trial, serve a copy of his answer u-pon the attorney of each of the defendants to be affooted by the determination, and personally or as the court
or judge may direct, upon the defendants so to be affected
who have not appearod in the action.
The purpose of section 1543 was to confer upon the
court in which an action of partition may be brought, authority to try and deteniine all

disputes which may arise be-

tween the :plaintiff and his co-tenants involving their respectivo titles and rights of possession to the property;
thus avoiding circuity, of' procedure and a multiplicity of
suits.

Weston v Stoddard (137 N.Y.119)
The commLissioners who frmnod this part of the code

stated it to be the intent of the, section to extend the
princi-ple of soction 1537 which provides for the trial of
the maost common, as well as the Yaost difficult cases of disputed title, to all cases where the question of title is
involved.

Now that the distinctions in equity and at law

ate abolished, and an ample provision is made for the trial
of questions of fact by a jury in equity actions, there is
no sufficient reason for driving the plaintiff to a new action to try title where it

is

disputed in the answer.

An answer by the defendant, that another action is
pending between tho same parties will be a sufficient
to the plaintiff's suit.

answer

But the pendency of an action for

partition in which the sinw:ors had not been served on one of
the defendants therein, is not a ground for the abatement of
a subsequent action for the same cause brought by such defendant
Warner,

in

the first

(27 N.Y.

action against the other partiQsWarner v
Sup.

ICO)

A defendant cannot demur to the answer of a codefendant.

Stuart v Blatchley (28 N.Y. Sup.

800)

Final Judgmont.
What to Contain.

Upon the confirmation, by the

court of the report of the coi1nissioners raking partition,
final judgmnent,

that the partition be firm and effectual for-

ever, must be rendered.
N

Section 1557. Code.

The final judgment is

of the comnissioners

a confirmation of the report

, whether there has been an actual par-

tition, or the property has been sold.

It is also a final

determination of the rights of the parties.
The decree should settle thr rights of all the
parties to the proceedings, and not leave a portion of the
property to be the subject of another proceeding in partition.
Post v Post (C5 Barb. 192)
The final judgment must also direct that each of the
parties, who i~s entitled to possession of a distinct parcel
allotted to him, be let into the possession thereof, either
inediately, or after the determination of the particular
estate, as the case requires.

Section 1558, Code.

The final judgment raust also award, that each defendant pay to the plaintiff

his proportion of the plaintiff',

costs, incl.using the oera allowance.

The sum to be paid

by each must bw fixed by the court according to the respective rights of the parties, and specified in the judgment.
Section 1559, Code.
A plaintiff recovering in partition is entitled to
costs, of course, and neither court nor referee has any discretion as to costs, nor can any portion of defendant's
costs be charged upon the plaintiff.

Davis v Davis ( 3 St.

Rep. 163)
The court may, in the interlocutory or final judgment adjust the rights of one or more of the parties as
against any other party or parties, by reason of the receipt,
by the latter, of more than his or their proper proportion
of the rents or profits of a share or part of a share, Section 1589, Code.
Whore it appears that partition cannot be made
equal between the parties, according to their respective
rights, without prejudice to the rights or interests of somo
of them,

the final judgment nay award compensation to be

made by one party to another for equailty of partition. But
compensation cannot be so awarded against a party who is
known,

or whose name is

unknown.

Nor can it

be awarded

un-

against an infant, unless it a-p-oears, that he has personal
property sufficient to pay it, and his interests will be
promoted thereby.
If

Section 1587, Code.

a sale is confirmed by the court, a final judg-

ment must be entered, confinrming it accordingly; directing
the officer making it to execute the proper oonveyance, and
to take the proper security, pursuant to the sale; and also
directing concerning the application of the proceeds of the
sale.

Section 1577, Code.

A purchaser at a partition

sale takes all thr rights and interests of the parties.
Beyer v Schieltz (54t N.Y.

o.4 l2)

Who Bound by Final Judgment.

A final judgment in

an action of partition is binding and conclusive upon the
following persons:
1.

The plaintiff;

each defendant upom whom the

summons was served, either personally, or without the state,
or by publication, pursuant to an order obtained for that
purpose, as prescribed in chapter fifth of this act; and the
legal representatives of each party,
division.

specified in

this sub-

So much of section four hundred and forty-five

of this act as requires the court to allow a defendant to
defend an action, after final judgment, does not apply to
an action for partition.
2.

Each person claining from,

through,

or under

such a party, by title accruing after the filing of the judgment roll, or after the filing in the proper county clerk's
office, of a notice of the pendency of the action, as prescribed in article ninth of this title,
3.

Each person not in being when the interloc-

utory judgment is rendered, who, by the happening of any
contingency, becomes afterwards entitled to a beneficial
interest attaching to, or an estate, or interest in, a portion of the property,

the person first

entitled to which,

or

other virtual representative whereof, was a party specified
in the first subdivision of this section.

But this section

does not apply to a party, whose right and interest are expressly reserved and left unaffected, as prescribed in section one thousand five hundred and thirty-nine of this act,
or to a person claiming from, through,

or under such a party.

Section 1557, Code.
Where judgment is rendered after a sale such final

judgment is-binding and conclusive upon the same persons,
upon whom a final judgment for partition is

made binding and

conclusive by section one thousand five hundred and fiftyseven of this act; and it effectually bars each of those
persons, who is

not a purchaser at the sale, from all

title, and interest in the property sold.
The judgment is

conclusive upon all

right,

Section 157t 7,Code.
parties,

not

only as to the matter actually determined, but as to every
other matter which the parties might have litigated, and
had decided as incident to, or essentially connected with
the subject matter of the litigation within the perviow of
the action either as matter of claim, or defense.
Van Epps (85 N.Y.

Jordan v

427)

The only relief for error is by appeal, the judgment
cannot be attacked collaterally,
the judgmnent is conclusive.

and if

no appeal is

Jordan v Van Epps,

taken

supra.

The lien of a creditor of the ancestor is not cut
off by a sale in partition of the lands descended to the
heirs; he may still apply for a sale of the property to pay
the debts of the ancestor.

!,ead v Jenkins (27 Hun 570)

After sale has been confirmed by final judgment the

parties to the action are deprived of all objections to the
regularity and legality of the proceedings.
(107

N.Y.

Reed v Reed,

545)
Where all

the persons in

esse having any estate

present or future, vested or contingent are made parties,the
judgment is conclusive as to the rights of all, and is sufficient to bar the future contingent interests of those not
in esse, although no notice is published to bring in unknown parties,

and though such future owners may take as

purchasers under a deed or will, and not as claimants under
any parties to the action.

Brevoort v Brevoort,(70 N.Y.136)

But this is so, only where the judgment provides for such
parties by substituting the fund derived from a sale of the
land in place of the land. Ponarque v MIonarque,(80 N.Y.320)
The judgment is

not conclusive,

as to one having a

contingent remainder in the propertyif not made a party.
Moore v Appleby (108 N.Y. 237)
A final judgment is also a bar against each person,
not a party, who has, at the time when it is rendered, a
general lien, by judgment or decree, on the undivided share
or interest of a party, if notice was given to appear before

the referee and make proof of liens,

as prescribed in

section

fifteen hundred and sixty-two of this act, and also against
each person made a party, who Then has a specific lien on
any such undivided share or interest; but a person having
any such specific lien appearing of record at the time of
the filing of the notice of the pendency of the action, who
is not made a party, is not affected by such judgnent. Section 1578, Codo.

